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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-1871
___________
RONALD G. JOHNSON,
Appellant
v.

OFFICER BINGNEAR; SUPERVISOR OFFICER RUBEN MARTINEZ;
OFFICER DEBORAH PROVENZA; BADGE #2479; STATE OF DELAWARE;
NEW CASTLE COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-00196)
District Judge: Honorable Leonard P. Stark
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 30, 2011
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 4, 2011 )
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Ronald G. Johnson, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s entry of
summary judgment in favor of Appellees. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily
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affirm the judgment of the District Court.
In April 2008, Johnson initiated a civil rights action in the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware, alleging that certain members of the New Castle
County Police Department violated his constitutional rights by knowingly filing false
felony charges against him. The facts underlying his complaint were based on events
occurring on two separate dates. On September 23, 2007, Officer Provenza responded to
a call at the home of Kelly Roache, to whom a No Contact Order (“NCO”) was issued on
September 7, 2007. The NCO prevented Johnson from coming within 100 yards of her,
her home, or her workplace. According to Officer Provenza’s police report, Johnson
showed up at Roache’s home to collect some of his belongings, they became involved in
an altercation, and he grabbed her shirt. He was no longer at the home when Officer
Provenza arrived. On the evening of September 23, 2007, Johnson repeatedly called
Roache’s residence. Officer Provenza stated that she heard twelve voicemail messages
from him and observed his telephone number on the caller ID four times. Following this
incident, Johnson was charged with aggravated harassment, offensive touching, and two
counts of breach of release. He was arraigned on September 27, 2007, at which time the
Judge ordered that the NCO would remain in place.
On November 23, 2007, Officer Bingnear responded to a call from Ms. Roache
alleging that Johnson was again in violation of the NCO. According to the police report,
while incarcerated at the Howard Young Correctional Institution, Johnson sent six letters
to Ms. Roache and her daughter, addressing them as “Esq.”, presumably to avoid
detection by the Howard Young staff. In the letters, Johnson told Roache that he loved
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her and wanted to live with her upon his release from prison, asked her and her daughter
not to testify against him at trial, and offered to give $200 to her and $100 to her
daughter. He was charged with one count of bribing a witness, and four counts of
noncompliance with the conditions of his bond. Officer Bingnear’s report was approved
by Sergeant Martinez.
In his complaint, Johnson named the State of Delaware, Officer Bingnear,
Sergeant Martinez, Officer Provenza, and the New Castle County Police Department as
defendants. He maintained that Officers Bingnear and Provenza knowingly filed false
felony charges against him with the purpose of illegally incarcerating him and increasing
the bail he would be subject to so he would not be able to get out of jail. He also asserted
that the New Castle County Police Department maintained a practice of overcharging
people with felonies instead of misdemeanors, with the intent to increase their bail and
induce them to plead guilty to the lesser offense.
On December 4, 2009, Appellees moved for summary judgment. Johnson was
directed to respond to the motion by January 14, 2010, but did not. On January 29, 2010,
he filed a motion for the appointment of counsel, alleging that he had suffered a mental
breakdown and had changed addresses and been incarcerated several times. He requested
additional time to file a response. In June of 2010, the Court ordered Johnson to show
cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Johnson responded
on July 29, 2010, averring that he had not responded to Appellees’ summary judgment
motion due to his impaired mental state. He did not explain why he was able to respond
to the order to show cause, but not the summary judgment motion. On September 30,
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2010, the Court ordered that Johnson be provided with an additional copy of Appellees’
motion, free of charge, and granted Johnson one final extension to respond to Appellees’
motion. The Court order stated that the response was due by October 22, 2010, and that
no further extensions would be granted. On October 5, 2010, Johnson filed a motion
requesting another extension for an unspecified amount of time, but did not indicate why
he could not file a response between that time and October 22. The Court denied the
motion and, on December 23, 2010, the District Court granted Appellees’ motion for
summary judgment. After the Court entered summary judgment, Johnson timely filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied on March 31, 2011. Johnson
timely filed a notice of appeal, pro se.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review

the District Court’s entry of summary judgment de novo, viewing the underlying facts
and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Appellant, the nonmoving party. See Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2010). Summary
judgment is appropriate only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A
party asserting that there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact must support that
assertion with specific citations to the record.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

Johnson’s primary claims are that Officers Bingnear and Provenza filed
unsupported felony charges against him, thereby subjecting him to false arrest and
malicious prosecution. While the District Court construed Johnson’s complaint as raising
a claim of excessive bail, Johnson disavowed this interpretation in his motion for
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reconsideration, explaining that he was not arguing that the bail set by the Magistrate
Judge was excessive, but rather that the named officers intentionally levied false felony
charges against him for the purpose of subjecting him to excessive bail.
First, we note that Johnson failed to meet his burden of responding to a motion for
summary judgment. While Johnson claims that he did not receive all of the Court’s
orders and correspondence, the record clearly reflects that he received some of them, that
he was aware of the pendency of Appellees’ summary judgment motion, and that he had
ample time to respond within the year during which the motion was pending.

Under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment
must cite to specific materials in the record that demonstrate the existence of a disputed
issue of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). To the extent that Johnson argues
that any such dispute exists, he fails to support his position with anything other than his
own assertion. While the District Court declined to enter summary judgment against
Johnson on these grounds, even if we were to consider Johnson’s motion for
reconsideration as a proper opposition to Appellees’ motion, we conclude that he does
not demonstrate a genuine dispute as to any material fact which would render the entry of
summary judgment inappropriate.
In order to prove a claim of false arrest, a litigant must show that the police lacked
probable cause for the arrest. See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d
Cir. 1995). “[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the
arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person
to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.”
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Orsatti v. New Jersey, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995). The question of whether
probable cause existed is often a question for the jury. See Groman, 47 F.3d at 635. In
this case, however, there is no dispute that an NCO was in place, and that Johnson had
violated it. While Johnson maintains that he was found not guilty at trial, Appellees’
records indicate that Johnson pled guilty to one count of breach of release. Johnson
offers no documentary evidence to dispute this. Furthermore, “‘[t]he proper inquiry in a
section 1983 claim based on false arrest . . . is not whether the person arrested in fact

committed the offense but whether the arresting officers had probable cause to
believe the person arrested had committed the offense.’” Groman, 47 F.3d at 634
(quoting Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988)). The
Officers in question undoubtedly had probable cause here.
In order to prevail on a claim of malicious prosecution, a litigant must demonstrate
that: “(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding
ended in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4)
the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to
justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of
seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582
F.3d 447, 461 (3d Cir. 2009). As the District Court held, because there was probable
cause for the arrests, Johnson’s claims of malicious prosecution must fail as well.
The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Sergeant Martinez on
the ground that Johnson failed to allege sufficient personal involvement on the part of
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Martinez to demonstrate that he personally violated Johnson’s constitutional rights. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948. While we agree that Johnson
alleged nothing more than that Sergeant Martinez approved Officer Bingnear’s police
report, we will affirm on the ground that, because there is no merit to the underlying
claim, there is no merit to any claim resting on a theory of respondeat superior.
With respect to Johnson’s claim that the New Castle County Police Department
maintained a practice of overcharging people with felonies with the intent to induce them
to plead guilty to misdemeanors, the District Court held that the Police Department is not
a separate entity for the purposes of this lawsuit, and that Johnson failed to file suit
against the proper party, the County of New Castle. The District Court therefore entered
summary judgment in favor of the New Castle County Police Department on this claim.
While we agree with the District Court’s disposition of this claim, we also note that
Johnson failed to support this allegation with anything other than his own assertion. This
is plainly insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
Finally, while Johnson did not allege any facts to support a claim of conspiracy, he
did cite 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 in his complaint. We agree with the District Court
that there is no support for these causes of action in the record. See Lake v. Arnold, 112
F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1997) (setting out elements of § 1985 claim); Robison v.
Canterbury Vill., Inc., 848 F.2d 424, 431 n.10 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a cognizable
claim under § 1985 is a prerequisite to a claim under § 1986).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial
question and, accordingly, will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. See
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3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
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